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The Discretionary Exercise of Supplemental 
Jurisdiction Under the Supplemental 
Jurisdiction Statute1 
Since the inception of the federal system of government in 
the United States, federal courts have continuously been 
required to strike a balance between jurisdictional limitations 
and the efficient adjudication of related claims. In response to 
the clamor for efficiency and contrary to the jurisdictional 
limits set by Congress, the federal judiciary developed the 
doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. These doctrines 
allow a party with a claim within the federal court's original 
jurisdiction to have related state-law claims heard with the 
federal claim so that the entire case can be resolved in one 
proceeding, even though there is no independent jurisdictional 
basis for the pendent or ancillary claims. 
In the past fifteen years the Supreme Court has gradually 
eroded the conceptual and constitutional underpinnings of 
pendent and ancillary practice, which have become a staple in 
the litigation community. Most recently the Supreme Court, in 
Finley v. United States2 refused to allow a court to exercise 
pendent party jurisdiction because Congress had not 
specifically allowed the court to exercise such jurisdi~tion.~ 
Although the facts of Finley dealt exclusively with pendent 
party jurisdiction, many interpreted the Court's reasoning as 
threatening the future of these efficiency promoting devices. 
Congress, recognizing the value of pendent and ancillary 
jurisdiction, responded by passing the supplemental jurisdiction 
statute which merged the doctrines of pendent and ancillary 
jurisdiction and provided a statutory basis for its exer~ise .~  
1. The author would like to thank Professor C. Douglas Floyd for his 
encouragement and feedback while writing this Comment. The views expressed 
herein, and any errors, however, remain the author's. 
2. 490 US. 545 (1989). 
3. Id. at 548. 
4. 28 U.S.C. 8 1367 (Supp. 1993). 
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As developed prior to Finley and the enactment of the 
supplemental jurisdiction statute, the decision to exercise 
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction over non-federal claims was 
left to the discretion of the court.5 In making that decision the 
court was to consider comity, efficiency, judicial economy, 
fairness to the litigants, and all aspects of the l i t igat i~n.~ 
Yet the supplemental jurisdiction statute seems to have 
changed the common law by constraining the bench's 
discretion. As enacted, the statute suggests a modicum of 
discretion is left to the courts with its use of the words "may 
decline jurisdiction," but that discretion appears to be 
exercisable only in specifically listed factual circumstances. 
Additionally, the statute does not specifically incorporate 
comity, efficiency, judicial economy, and fairness, the factors 
constituting the core of the common law's discretionary 
analysis. 
This Comment analyzes how the supplemental jurisdiction 
statute has constrained a court's discretion to hear 
supplemental claims and explores the distinct approaches to 
judicial discretion taken by the various courts as they build 
foundational case law around this relatively new statute. Part I 
explores the history of modern pendent and ancillary 
jurisdiction practice, the case law leading up to the codification 
of supplemental jurisdiction, and the supplemental jurisdiction 
statute. Part I1 examines the discretionary portion of the 
supplemental jurisdiction statute and how it differs from prior 
common-law practice. Part I11 looks at  each of the statutory 
bases under which a judge can decline to exercise jurisdiction 
in more detail, including their origin, how they differ from pre- 
codification practice, and unique problems that may arise 
under each of them. Part IV explains and distinguishes the 
various approaches courts have taken in the discretionary 
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction after its codification. 
I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO THE ENACTMENT 
OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION STATUTE 
In the beginning, Justice Marshall provided for expansive 
jurisdiction of the federal courts. He positioned the 
Constitution's jurisdictional limits on the federal courts at  the 
5. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). 
6. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351 (1988). 
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ends of reason. As long as an original ingredient of the claim 
involved a federal element, no matter how remote from the 
actual substance of the claim, a federal court could hear the 
case.? But the Constitution alone does not set the jurisdictional 
limits. Those limits are established by the affirmative grants of 
jurisdiction that Congress allots to the judiciary within the 
limits of the Constituti~n.~ However, Congress has never 
granted jurisdiction to the federal judiciary that extended to 
the constitutional limit as expressed by Justice Marshall in 
Osborn. The resulting gap creates significant problems for 
litigants. 
In the past, when faced with a situation that gave rise to 
both federal and state claims, a litigant was forced to choose 
either to forego the state claims and sue in federal court, to 
bring the federal claims in state court, or to litigate in both 
forums simultaneously. As none of these options was 
particularly appealing, the federal courts, in an effort to 
streamline the judicial process, relied upon the conceptual basis 
established by Osborn to develop the doctrines of pendent and 
ancillary jurisdiction. 
The law of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction entered the 
modern era with the Supreme Court's decision in United Mine 
Workers v. Gib 6s .' The Gib bs decision allowed expansive 
jurisdiction over pendent claims,1° and was subsequently 
7. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 US. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824): 
m h e n  a question to which the judicial power of the Union is extended 
by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the 
power of Congress to give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that cause, 
although other questions of fact or of law may be involved in it. 
8. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 442 (1850): 
[Tlhe disposal of the judicial power . . . belongs to  Congress; and the 
courts cannot exercise jurisdiction in every case to which the judicial 
power extends, without the intervention of Congress, who are not bound 
to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Federal courts to every subject which 
the Constitution might warrant. . . . Both the Constitution and an act of 
Congress must concur in conferring power upon the Circuit Courts. 
9. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). For a summary of the evolution of pendent and 
ancillary jurisdiction prior to Gibbs, see 13B CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AM) PROCEDURE $4 3567-3567.3 (2d ed. 1984 & Supp. 1995) [hereinafter 
WRIGHT & MILLER] (pendent jurisdiction) and 13 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra, $ 3523 
(ancillary jurisdiction). See also Richard A. Matasar, A Pendent and Ancillary 
Jurisdiction Primer: The Scope and Limits of Supplemental Jurisdiction, 17 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 103 (1983). 
10. A federal court exercises pendent claim jurisdiction when there is a 
proper federal claim before it and the court agrees to hear a related state claim 
between the same plaintiff and defendant for which there is no original 
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extended to cases of pendent party" and ancillary 
j urisdiction.12 This Part will examine Gi b bs and subsequent 
case law, the need for a statutory basis for supplemental 
jurisdiction, and the supplemental jurisdiction statute itself. 
A. The Case Law 
1. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs 
In United Mine Workers u. Gibbs,13 Gibbs had entered 
into an employment contract with the Grundy Company in 
which he was to be a mining supervisor. Before he was able to 
assume his position, he was fired due to a conflict with United 
Mine Workers and another union. Subsequently, Gibbs began 
to lose other hauling contracts and mining leases. Alleging that 
these losses were a result of concerted union action, he sued 
United Mine Workers, alleging a violation of the Labor Man- 
agement Relations Act, a federal claim, and state law claims of 
conspiracy and interference with an employment contract.14 
The district court dismissed the federal claim after the jury's 
verdict and retained jurisdiction over the state law claims. 
In approving the district court's decision to entertain the 
pendent state claim, the Supreme Court indicated that the 
jurisdiction. 
11. Assuming a plaintiff has asserted federal claims against a defendant, 
pendent party jurisdiction allows the court to exercise jurisdiction over state law 
claims against a different, non-diverse defendant. Rodriguez v. Pacificare, Inc., 980 
F.2d 1014, 1018 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2456 (1993); see 13B 
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 9, $5 3567.1-.2. 
12. Whereas pendent party jurisdiction has focused on claims asserted by the 
plaintiff, ancillary jurisdiction provides a district court with the jurisdiction to hear 
claims and add parties by defendants or intervenors. Matasar, supra note 9, a t  104 
n.1; see 13 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 9, 5 3523. The crux of ancillary 
jurisdiction depends upon the control of property or funds to be disposed of by the 
court, in which case parties may join the controversy to protect an interest in the 
property. 
The general rule is that when a federal court has properly acquired 
jurisdiction over a cause it may entertain, by intervention, dependent or 
ancillary controversies; but no controversy can be regarded as dependent 
or ancillary unless it has direct relation to property or assets actually or 
constructively drawn into the court's possession or control by the principal 
suit. 
Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Hozier, 267 U.S. 276, 280 (1925). 
13. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). The Supreme Court's analysis will be treated a t  
length elsewhere. See infra part 1I.A. 
14. Id. at  717-20. 
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threshold inquiry was into the relationship of the claims. Be- 
fore pendent claim jurisdiction was proper, the state and feder- 
al claims must constitute "one constitutional 'case"' or, as stat- 
ed differently, the claims must "derive from a common nucleus 
of operative fact.'"' Once this determination was made, the 
court's concern with the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction 
was allayed, and it had the power to hear the pendent claim. 
The Court's second inquiry focused on the practical determina- 
tion of whether the claim should be heard in federal court. It 
left that decision with the trial courts, admonishing each to 
consider "judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to liti- 
gant~.'''~ After Gibbs, the exercise of pendent claim jurisdic- 
tion, pendent party jurisdiction, and ancillary jurisdiction pro- 
liferated under the new, less restrictive "common nucleus of 
operative fact" standard. l7 
2. Aldinger v. Howard 
In Aldinger v. Howard, l8 the Court limited pendent party 
jurisdiction by requiring, for the first time, a statutory basis for 
its exercise. Monica Aldinger's supervisor, Merton Howard, 
fired her from her position as a clerk in the county treasurer's 
office solely because she was living with her boyfkiend.19 She 
brought a claim against Howard individually, under 5 1983:~ 
and asked the district court to exercise pendent party jurisdic- 
tion over her state law claims against the county.21 The Su- 
15. Id. a t  725. 
16. Id. a t  726. 
17. The test was more liberal in the sense that Gibbs expanded the standard 
from a "cause of action" standard to a "common nucleus of operative fact." The 
Court had created the cause of action language in Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 
(1933), where "cause of action" was interpreted very narrowly. In Hurn, the state 
and federal claims were "little more than the equivalent of different epithets to 
characterize the same group of circumstances." Id. a t  246. After the adoption of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with its liberal joinder provisions and permissive 
pleading requirements, significant confusion arose when the courts tried to apply 
the cause of action limitation into the new context. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 
U.S. 1, 9 (1976); Gibbs, 383 U.S. at  722-24; Richard A. Matasar, Rediscovering 
"One Constitutional Case": Procedural Rules and the Rejection of the Gibbs Test for 
Supplemental Jurisdiction, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1399, 1413-14 (1983). 
18. 427 US. 1 (1976). 
19. Id. a t  3. 
20. 42 U.S.C. !j 1983 (1988). 
21. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at  4. The state .law claims were "said to rest on state 
statutes waiving the county's sovereign immunity and providing for vicarious liabil- 
ity arising out of tortious conduct of its officials." Id. at  5. 
1268 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995 
preme Court had previously held that counties were not con- 
sidered "persons" for the purpose of suit under § 1983 and thus 
could not be a defendant in a civil rights action in federal 
Yet Aldinger sought to use pendent party jurisdiction 
to bring the county into federal court even though the Supreme 
Court had interpreted 5 1983 to exclude counties from this type 
of liability by denying federal courts the power to exercise juris- 
diction over them. Looking for the first time at a jurisdictional 
statute23 as a necessary source of law for the exercise of pen- 
dent party jurisdiction, the Court resolved that "the reach of a 
statute conferring jurisdiction should be construed in light of 
the scope of the cause of action as to which federal judicial 
power has been extended by C~ngress ."~~ Because it had inter- 
preted § 1983 to exclude counties, leaving no basis for original 
jurisdiction over counties in federal court, the Court was reluc- 
tant to find in the jurisdictional statute an alternative basis for 
entertaining claims against counties in federal court, and did 
not do so.25 However, the Court did suggest that the exercise 
of pendent party jurisdiction may be proper to avoid bifurcated 
proceedings where the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction 
over the federal claim.26 
3. Finley v. United States 
Justice Scalia sounded the death knell of pendent party 
jurisdiction in Finley v. United States.27 In Finley, plaintiffs 
family was killed when the airplane in which the family was 
22. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-91 (1961), overruled by Monell v. De- 
partment of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
23. 28 U.S.C. $ 1343(3) (1988). 
24. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at  17. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 18: 
When the grant of jurisdiction to a federal court is exclusive, for example, 
as in the prosecution of tort claims against the United States . . . the ar- 
gument of judicial economy and convenience can be coupled with the 
additional argument that only in a federal court may all of the claims be 
tried together . . . . 
See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 557-58 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
Many courts relied on this language in Aldinger and allowed the exercise of 
pendent party jurisdiction in instances where the federal courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction. See Ellen S. Mouchawar, Note, The Congressional Resurrection of Sup- 
plemental Jurisdiction in the Post-Finley Era, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1611, 1625 11.90 
(1991) (identifying instances and collecting cases in which the federal courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction). 
27. 490 U.S. 545 (1989). 
SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION 
flying struck electric transmission lines prior to landing. The 
power lines were not illuminated as they should have been, and 
were thus not visible to the occupants of the plane. Initially the 
plaintiff brought a negligence claim against the San Diego Gas 
and Electric Company and the City of San Diego in state court. 
Later, upon learning that the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) had the duty to  illuminate the power lines, plaintiff filed 
a complaint in federal court. Subsequently, she sought to add 
the parties in the state action to the federal case, but as both 
plaintiff and the state defendants were residents of California, 
there was no independent basis for jurisdiction. 
Jurisdiction in the federal cause of action against the FAA 
was based upon the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),28 which 
provides the federal courts with exclusive jurisdi~tion.~' In- 
stead of preserving common-law pendent party jurisdiction in 
cases of exclusive jurisdiction as it suggested it would in 
Aldinger, the Court took a more restrictive tack requiring both 
constitutional power and congressional authorization before the 
federal courts could properly have jurisdiction over pendent 
parties.30 The FTCA did not provide for jurisdiction over pen- 
dent parties, so federal jurisdiction over the state law claims 
was improper.31 
Ostensibly, the Court distinguished the facts before it from 
pendent claim and ancillary jurisdiction cases,32 but by refus- 
ing to accept the Gibbs analysis in the pendent party context33 
and by requiring statutory authorization prior to exercising 
pendent party jurisdiction, the Court undermined the entire 
foundation of what is now known as supplemental jurisdic- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  However, while Justice Scalia closed a door on previous 
28. Id. a t  546. ~ 
29. 28 U.S.C. !$ 1346(b) (1988) ("The district courts . . . shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States . . . ."). 
30. Finley, 490 US. a t  548 ("'[Tlwo things are necessary to create jurisdiction, 
whether original or appellate. The Constitution must have given to the court the 
capacity to take it, and an act of Congress must have supplied it . . . . To the 
extent that such action is not taken, the power lies dormant.'") (quoting Mayor v. 
Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 252 (1868)) (emphasis added). 
31. Id. a t  552-56 (refuting arguments that the FTCA supports exercise of pen- 
dent jurisdiction). 
32. Id. a t  549, 551-52. 
33. Id. a t  549-52. 
34. The response to the Court's ruling in Finley was, if nothing else, enter- 
taining. See Harbor Ins. Co. v. Continental Bank Corp., 922 F.2d 357, 361 (7th 
Cir. 1990) ("We are well aware that [the Finleyl decision is premised on a hostility 
to nonstztutory jurisdiction that may eventually sweep into history's dustbin not 
1270 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995 
practice, he opened a window inviting Congress to step into the 
pendent jurisdiction arena and provide a statutory basis for the 
exercise of supplemental jurisdi~tion.~~ 
B. The Federal Courts Study Committee 
In 1988 Congress created the Federal Courts Study Com- 
mittee (Comrnitteer6 with the mandate to "make a complete 
study of the courts of the United States and of the several 
States and . . . recommend revisions to be made to laws of the 
United States as the Committee, on the basis of such study, 
deems advi~able."~~ In its report, the Committee recognized 
the questions Finley raised38 and recommended that "Con- 
gress expressly authorize federal courts to hear any claim 
arising out of the same 'transaction or occurrence' as a claim 
within federal jurisdiction, including claims, within federal 
question jurisdiction, that require the joinder of additional 
parties."39 The entire recommendation comprised less than 
only whatever pendent party jurisdiction survives the holding of Finley but also 
pendent claim jurisdiction and ancillary jurisdiction. "). "Supplemental jurisdiction," 
therefore, "is arguably dead and surely expiring." Thomas M. Mengler, The Demise 
of Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 247, 248. "In Finley, 
the Supreme Court turned [the Gibbs-Aldinger-Kroger] analytical framework on its 
head and in the process took the breath away from all forms of supplemental 
jurisdiction." Id. a t  255. "Similar reasoning [to that of Finley] applied to other 
jurisdictional statutes, would have a devastating effect on the availability of supple- 
mental jurisdiction." Rex E. Lee & Richard G. Wilkins, An Analysis of Supplemen- 
tal Jurisdiction and Abstention with Recommendations for Legislative Action, 1990 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 321, 330. "[Tlhe Finley Court declared Gibbs brain dead, but re- 
fused to discontinue life support. One can only wonder how long this can continue." 
Wendy C. Perdue, Finley v. United States: Unstringing Pendent Jurisdiction, 76 
VA. L. REV. 539, 568 (1990); see also Mouchawar, supra note 26, at  1648. 
Lower court reaction to Finley and its effect on pendent claim and ancillary 
jurisdiction was mixed. See Perdue, supra note 34, a t  888-89 & nn.229-33 (collect- 
ing cases). 
35. Finley, 490 U.S. at  556 ("Whatever we say regarding the scope of jurisdic- 
tion conferred by a particular statute can of course be changed by Congress. What 
is of paramount importance is that Congress be able to legislate against a back- 
ground of clear interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of the language 
i t  adopts."). 
36. 102 Stat. 4642 (1988). 
37. Id. !$ 105. 
38. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY CO~~MITIEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 
STUDY COMMIT~EE 47 (1990) [hereinafter COMMITTEE REPORT] (%cent decisions of 
the Supreme Court raise doubts about the scope of pendent party and ancillary 
jurisdiction under existing federal statutes."). 
39. Id. Ironically, one of the compelling factors behind the creation of the 
Federal Courts Study Committee was the need to reduce the federal docket. How- 
ever, when addressing the uncertainty of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction after 
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one page of the Committee's report and did not include a pro- 
posed statute. 
C. The Statute 
Congress adopted the Committee's recommendations as a 
portion of the omnibus Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 
(JIA)* The supplemental jurisdiction portion of the JIA is 
codified as 28 U.S.C. 5 1367.~' This Comment is concerned 
Finley, concerns for efficiency won out. Even though the Committee realized that 
this would increase the caseload of the federal courts, it reasoned first that federal 
issues should be heard in federal court, and second that overly broad discretion on 
the part of the district court to dismiss pendent and ancillary claims and parties 
would result in parties litigating their entire "case" in state court. That possibility 
led the Committee to suggest the expansion of supplemental jurisdiction and the 
limitation of judicial discretion not to hear supplemental claims. FEDERAL COURTS 
STUDY COMMITTEE, WORKING PAPERS AND S U B C O M M I ~ E  REPORTS 562 (1990) 
[hereinafter WORKING PAPERS]. 
40. The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 
5089. For a participant's treatment of the legislative development of the supple- 
mental jurisdiction statute, see Arthur D. Wolf, Codification of Supplemental Juris- 
diction: Anatomy of a Legislative Proposal, 14 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1 (1992). 
41. The entire statute reads as follows: 
Supplemental Jurisdiction 
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly pro- 
vided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the dis- 
trict courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supple- 
mental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in 
the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the 
same case or controversy under Article I11 of the United States Constitu- 
tion. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the 
joinder or intervention of additional parties. 
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original juris- 
diction founded solely on section 1332 of this title, the district courts 
shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims 
by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed 
to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to inter- 
vene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising supple- 
mental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the juris- 
dictional requirements of section 1332. 
(c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdic- 
tion over a claim under subsection (a) if- 
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, 
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims 
over which the district court has original jurisdiction, 
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has 
original jurisdiction, or 
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling rea- 
sons for declining jurisdiction. 
(d) The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection 
(a), and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dis- 
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with the discretionary portion of the statute contained in sub- 
section (c): 
(c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if- 
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State 
law, 
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim 
or claims over which the district court has original juris- 
diction, 
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over 
which it has original jurisdiction, or 
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other com- 
pelling reasons for declining jurisdiction." 
Although this portion of the JIA was one of the most impor- 
tant, there is relatively little legislative history for guidance in 
its interpretat i~n.~~ In its Report, the Committee's direction is 
sparse as weW4 
11. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE COMMON LAW AND THE SUP- 
PLEMENTAL JURISDICTION STATUTE 
Congress intended the supplemental jurisdiction statute to 
codify the pre-Finley status of pendent and ancillary 
jurisdi~tion.~~ Whether, in fact, that is the actual result of the 
enactment of $ 1367 is a matter of great debate.46 This Part 
missed at the same time as or after the dismissal of the claim under 
subsection (a), shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period 
of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer 
tolling period. 
(e) As used in this section, the term "State" includes the District of 
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or posses- 
sion of the United States. 
42. 28 U.S.C. 5 1367(c). 
43. H.R. REP. NO. 734, lOlst Cong., 2nd Sess. 27-30 (1990). 
44. C O M M ~ E  R PORT, supra note 38, at  47-48 (1990). The Committee also 
published a multi-volume set containing findings, but its contents are specifically 
not adopted by the Committee as a whole. See id. a t  3. 
45. H.R. REP. NO. 734, supra note 43, at  28 ("This section 113671 would au- 
thorize jurisdiction in a case like Finley, as well as essentially restore the pre- 
Finley understandings of the authorization for and limits on other forms of sup- 
plemental jurisdiction."). The fact that Congress adopted the recommendation of the 
Committee, and the Committee envisioned a liberal supplemental jurisdiction stat- 
ute (contrary to Finley), further supports this assertion. C O M M ~ ~ ~ E E  REPORT, supra 
note 38, a t  47 (1990). 
46. The debate has been particularly heated in the statute's treatment of 
joinder of parties under 28 U.S.C. $ 1367(b) (1988). See Richard D. Freer, Corn- 
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will examine a district court's discretion in exercising supple- 
mental jurisdiction both before and after the supplemental 
jurisdiction statute. In analyzing how the statute may have 
altered the discretionary analysis, this Comment will focus on 
the text of the statute, legislative history, and the Committee's 
recommendations. 
A. Pre-1367-The Gibbs Approach 
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs4? was the crystallization of 
the modern approach to pendent jurisdiction. The Supreme 
Court, in deciding to assert pendent claim jurisdiction over the 
claim of interference with an employment contract, created a 
two-part test, consisting of a power element and a discretionary 
element. The power element determined whether the district 
court could constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over the pen- 
dent claim. Under this prong, the federal claim had to be sub- 
stantial." Additionally, the state and federal claims had to 
constitute one "constitutional case," which the court appeared 
pounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Life After Finley and the Supple- 
mental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 445 (1991); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr .  et al., 
Compounding or Creating Confusions About Supplemental Jurisdiction? A Reply to 
Professor Freer, 40 EMORY L.J. 943 (1991) (Professors Rowe, Burbank, and Mengler 
are the authors of the supplemental jurisdiction statute); Thomas C. Arthur & 
Richard D. Freer, Grasping a t  Burnt Straws: The Disaster of the Supplemental 
Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 963 (1991); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.  et al., A 
Coda on Supplemental Jurisdiction, 40 EMORY L.J. 993 (1991); Thomas C. Arthur 
& Richard D. Freer, Close Enough for Government Work: What Happens When Con- 
gress Doesn't Do Its Job, 40 EMORY L.J. 1007 (1991); Erwin Chemerinsky, Rational- 
izing Jurisdiction, 41 EMORY L.J. 1 (1992); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Debate over 
$ 1367: Defining the Power to Define Federal Judicial Power, 41 EMORY L.J. 13 
(1992); Karen N. Moore, The Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute: An Important But 
Controversial Supplement to Federal Jurisdiction, 41 EMORY L.J. 31 (1992); Wendy 
C. Perdue, The New Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute-Flawed But Fixable, 41 
EMORY L.J. 69 (1992); Joan Steinman, Section 1367-Another Party Heard From, 
41 EMORY L.J. 85 (1992). See generally Denis F. McLaughlin, The Federal Supple- 
mental Jurisdiction Statute-A Constitutional and Statutory Analysis, 24 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 1 (1992). 
47. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). For the facts of Gibbs, see supra part I.A.1. 
48. Id. a t  725. The standard for substantiality, however, is very low. In 
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 US.  528 (1974), Justice White reviewed cases stating the 
standards for substantiality of a constitutional claim, including phrases like "so 
attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit," "wholly insub- 
stantial," "obviously frivolous," "no longer open to discussion," and "essentially ficti- 
tious." Id. a t  536-37. Justice Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion, stated his in- 
terpretation of the majority's standard for substantiality as  follows: "Under today's 
rationale it  appears sufficient for jurisdiction that a plaintiff is able to plead his 
claim with a straight face." Id. a t  564 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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to equate with the requirement that the claims "arise from a 
common nucleus of operative fact."49 The discretionary ele- 
ment reflected the underlying purpose of supplemental jurisdic- 
tion: to promote the efficient adjudication of related claims in a 
single forum.50 The Gibbs Court stated this purpose in terms 
of "judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants?'' 
A court should not assert jurisdiction over the pendent claims 
unless considerations of economy, convenience, and fairness are 
best served by its exercise.52 The presumption was that pen- 
dent jurisdiction not be exercised unless affirmative consider- 
ations compel its use.53 Many cases acknowledged categories 
in which the Gibbs discretionary balancing would not favor the 
exercise of pendent jurisdiction: dismissal of the jurisdiction- 
conferring claim early in the pro~eedings,'~ jury confusion,55 
the predominance of state law claims pred~rninate ,~~ and the 
"unsettled nature of state law."57 
B. Section 1367 
Having examined the pre-codification approach to pendent 
and ancillary jurisdiction, this Comment will now examine 
supplemental jurisdiction in terms of its statutory language, 
legislative history, and the recommendations of the Committee 
in an attempt to discern the similarities and differences, if any, 
49. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at  725. 
50. See id. a t  726; Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 789 
(3d Cir. 1995) (dicta); Matasar, supra note 9, a t  106, 110-15. 
51. Gibbs, 383 US. at  726. In Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 
(1988), the Court stated these factors in terms of "economy, convenience, fairness, 
and comity." Id. a t  351. 
52. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at  726; see Carnegie-Mellon, 484 US. at  350 ("[A] federal 
court should consider and weigh in each case, and at  every stage of the litigation, 
the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in order to decide 
whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case . . . ."). 
53. Gibbs, 383 US. at  726 ("Its justification lies in considerations of judicial 
economy, convenience and fairness to litigants; if these are not present a federal 
court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state claims, even though bound to 
apply state law to them.") (emphasis added). 
54. See id.; Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. a t  350-51 & n.7 (1988); Rosado v. 
Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1970). Under the Gibbs analysis, the federal claim 
had to be substantial. If the federal claim was dismissed for failure to state a 
claim, the court was not able to consider pendent claims because there never 
existed a valid federal question claim to which pendent claims could be appended. 
See supm note 48 (noting the low substantiality threshold). 
55. See, e.g., Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 715 (1973). 
56. See, e.g., Hubbard v. Moore, 537 F. Supp. 126, 130-31 (W.D. Ark. 1982). 
57. See, e.g., Moore, 411 U.S. a t  716. 
12631 SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION 1275 
between the prior common-law approach to the discretionary 
portion of the supplemental jurisdiction analysis and the ap- 
proach taken by the statute. 
1. The statutory language 
The statute seems to have essentially codified the power 
prong of the Gibbs analysis by requiring that the district court 
have original jurisdiction over some element of the case? The 
statute, however, does not adopt the "common nucleus of oper- 
ative fact" language to define the scope of the jurisdiction. In- 
stead, it makes direct reference to the Constitution's case or 
controversy requirement," which is really not a deviation 
from Gibbs, as the "common nucleus of operative fact" language 
is the Gibbs Court's restatement of a "constitutional 'case.' "'O 
All appellate courts that have considered the issue support this 
proposition; the supplemental jurisdiction statute made no 
change to the power portion of the Gibbs analysis? 
On its face, however, the supplemental jurisdiction statute 
seems to change the discretionary prong. Initially, one notes 
that nowhere in the statute do the terms fairness, economy, 
comity, or convenience appear. Their absence raises two possi- 
bilities. Either the drafters of the statute sought to make a 
change from previous practice, or they thought that they could 
codify previous practice by referring to previously recognized 
factual categories in which pendent claims were traditionally 
allowed. Both possibilities will be addressed in examination of 
the legislative hi~tory.'~ Even though absent from the statute, 
as will be seen below, courts continue to consider the Gibbs 
factors in three of their general approa~hes .~~  
Under Gibbs the presumption was that pendent jurisdic- 
tion would not be appropriate unless the balance of consider- 
58. 28 U.S.C. $ 1367(a) (stating that "in any civil action of which the district 
cowts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental juris- 
diction"). 
59. See US. CONST. art. 111, $ 2, cl. 2; see also Gibbs, 383 U.S. a t  725. 
60. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at  725; see also Lyon v. Whisman, 45 F.3d 758, 759-60 
(3d Cir. 1995) (requiring both a substantial claim and a two-step constitutional 
case requirement under $ 1367). 
61. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Dora1 Mortg. Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 1175 (1st Cir. 
1995); Lyon, 45 F.3d at  759-60; Palmer v. Hospital Auth., 22 F.3d 1559, 1568 (11th 
Cir. 1994); Burns-Toole v. Byrne, 11 F.3d 1270, 1276 (5th Cir. 1994); 13B WRIGHT 
& MILLER, supra note 9, 4 3567.1. 
62. See infra part IV.B-D. 
63. See infra part IV.B-D. 
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ations of economy and fairness weighed in favor of its exer- 
~ i s e . ~ ~  Under the supplemental jurisdiction statute, however, 
district courts are commanded not to exercise discretion to 
refuse to hear supplemental claims unless any of a number of 
circumstances are apparent.65 Subsection (a) states that "the 
district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction" unless 
there are other statutory provisions to the contrary, including 
subsections (b) or (c)? Therefore, contrary to Gibbs, under 
5 1367(a) the presumption is that the district courts have juris- 
diction unless compelled otherwise by statute?' 
Under Gibbs, the court was to consider all aspects of the 
litigation in order to determine what would be the best for all 
parties concerned? The supplemental jurisdiction statute has 
cabined those instances in which the court can even consider 
declining to exercise jurisdi~tion.~~ Even though subsection 
(c)(4) provides for dismissal in exceptional circumstances, those 
circumstances are not, and have not been, considered to be 
nearly as broad as the considerations under Gibbs." 
- -- -- 
64. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at  726; Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. a t  350. 
65. "The statute plainly allows the district court to reject jurisdiction over 
supplemental claims only in the four instances described therein." McLaurin v. 
Prater, 30 F.3d 982, 985 (8th Cir. 1994): But see Jason C.N. Smith, Comment, 
Update on Changes in Federal Jurisdiction: Supplemental Jurisdiction, Venue, and 
Removal, 23 TEX. TECH L. REV. 571, 579 (1992) (asserting that the statutory list is 
only a suggestion of when a district court should decline jurisdiction). 
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (emphasis added); McLaurin, 30 F.3d at  984-85 (inter- 
preting "shall" as "a mandatory command" and to be interpreted as having the 
same meaning as the word "shall" in 28 U.S.C. $§ 1331-32 (the federal question 
and diversity jurisdiction statutes)); see also Executive Software North Am., Inc. v. 
United States Dist. Court, 24 F.3d 1545, 1555-56 (9th Cir. 1994). 
67. See John B. Oakley, Recent Statutory Changes in the Law of Federal Ju-  
risdiction and Venue: The Judicial Improvements Acts of 1988 and 1990, 24 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 735, 766 (1991) ("By the juxtaposition of sections 1367(a) and 
1367(c) Congress appears to have created a strong presumption in favor of the 
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction."); see also Cedillo v. Valcar Enter. & Darling 
Delaware Co., 773 F. Supp. 932, 939 (N.D. Tex. 1991). 
68. See, e.g., Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). 
But see Rodriguez v. Dora1 Mortg. Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 1177 (1st Cir. 1995) (ad- 
monishing a district court to "assess the totality of the attendant circumstances" 
when making its "discretionary determination on the jurisdictional question" under 
the supplemental jurisdiction statute). 
69. E.g., Executive Software, 24 F.3d at  1555-56; see Lyon v. Whisman, 45 
F.3d 758, 762 n.8 (3d Cir. 1995). 
70. See infia part 1II.D. 
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2. The legislative history 
There is very little legislative history underlying 5 1367. In 
fact, only one three-line paragraph is addressed to subsection 
(c).?' Congress recognized that Finley threatened the practice 
of supplemental jurisdiction, and the legislative history indi- 
cates that the purpose of the statute is to overrule Finley and 
codify pre-Finley pra~tice.?~ 
The House Report is internally inconsistent, however, and 
raises more questions than it answers. While indicating that 
the statute's purpose is to codify pre-Finley practice, the discre- 
tionary portion of the statute does not use the Gibbs lan- 
g ~ a g e , ? ~  but instead "codifies the factors that the Supreme 
Court has recognized as providing legitimate bases upon which 
a district court may decline jurisdi~tion."~~ This could be read 
to require that courts not consider any of the Gibbs factors, but 
rather exercise their discretion only when one of the specific 
instances in subsection (c) arises. The use of the word "bases" 
indicates that Congress may have been trying to short-cut the 
supplemental jurisdiction analysis by examining the reasons 
for which pendent jurisdiction is usually declined, and codifying 
them. If that is the proper interpretation of the legislative 
history, then a court's discretion is dramatically curtailed un- 
der 5 1367; as some considerations are specifically omitted, 
71. Subsection [1367(c)1 codifies the factors that the Supreme Court has 
recognized as providing legitimate bases upon which a district court 
may decline jurisdiction over a supplemental claim, even though it is 
empowered to hear the claim. Subsection (c)(l)-(3) codifies the factors 
recognized as relevant under current law. Subsection (c)(4) acknowl- 
edges that occasionally there may exist other compelling reasons for a 
district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction, which the subsection 
does not foreclose a court from considering in exceptional circumstanc- 
es. As under current law, subsection (c) requires the district court, in 
exercising its discretion, to undertake a case specific analysis. 
H.R. REP. NO. 734, supra note 43, a t  29. The above constitutes the entire legisla- 
tive history relating to subsection (c) from the House, and the Senate legislative 
history is limited to the above report, which was adopted by the Senate, and one 
Senator's remarks upon the floor. 
72. Id. at  28. 
73. See infia notes 142-44 and accompanying text (noting that the Gibbs fac- 
tors, judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants were in drafts of 
the supplemental jurisdiction statute, but were removed in favor of the "exceptional 
circumstances" language after commentators protested that the above factors would 
not sufficiently cabin judicial discretion). 
74. H.R. REP. NO. 734, supra note 43, a t  29 (emphasis added). 
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most notably the possibility of jury confusion as a result of 
divergent theories of relief with state and federal claims.75 
However, the above interpretation-that the analysis was 
fundamentally changed-goes against the feel of the legislative 
history and the underlying purpose of supplemental jurisdio 
tion-the efficient adjudication of claims.76 The House Report 
praises the liberal use of supplemental juri~diction,~~ and then 
identifies the core problem after Finley as being a threat to this 
efficiency promoting device.78 Under this less dramatic inter- 
pretation of the legislative history, efficiency should be the 
court's major consideration when determining whether or not to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction. However, a pure efficiency 
analysis would almost always weigh in favor of exercising juris- 
diction and consolidating claims, and is contrary to the teach- 
ings of Gibbs-which also considered deference to state courts 
and avoidance of unnecessary decisions of state law.?' 
Whichever interpretation of the official legislative history 
one takes, only one thing is clear: there is no specific mention 
of the Gibbs factors in the legislative history and there is no 
75. Jury confusion was one of the instances suggested by the Gibbs Court in 
which pendent jurisdiction may be improper. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 
US.  715, 727 (1966). 
76. Professor McLaughlin notes: 
Because of the practical considerations of judicial efficiency and fairness 
to the litigant are so clearly established as the bedrock of supplemental 
jurisdiction, however, it would seem unlikely that a significant limitation 
in the use of these discretionary factors, contrary to that allowed under 
the prior case law, would be intended without a word of explanation in 
the legislative history or in the articles by the professors drafting the 
statute. 
McLaughlin, supra note 46, at  976. 
77. Supplemental jurisdiction has enabled federal courts and litigants to 
take advantage of the [liberal] federal procedural rules . . . to deal 
economically-in single rather than multiple litigation-with related 
matters . . . . Moreover, the district courts' exercise of supplemental 
jurisdiction, by making federal court a practical arena for the resolu- 
tion of an entire controversy, has effectuated Congress's intent . . . to 
provide plaintiffs with a federal forum for litigating claims within 
original federal jurisdiction. 
H.R. REP. NO. 734, supra note 43, at  28. 
One of the concerns with pendent and supplemental jurisdiction is that without 
it, when faced with a choice of bifurcated litigation and complete litigation in state 
court, a plaintiff would use the latter. That choice would lead to the common adju- 
dication of federal issues in state court systems, hardly a policy Congress would 
wish to promote. 
78. Id. 
79. Gibbs, 383 U.S. a t  726-27. 
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corresponding duty, explicit or otherwise, to consider "judicial 
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity"80 to determine if 
assertion of supplemental jurisdiction would be proper. No- 
where in the legislative history are the Gibbs factors men- 
tioned? However, some courts have taken the approach that 
because the legislative history indicates that the purpose of the 
supplemental jurisdiction statute was to codify pre-Finley prac- 
tice, the statute does not change the Gibbs analysis at  all. 
Thus, the Gibbs factors are to be considered and courts are left 
with discretion unfettered by statutory language. 
3. Recommendations of the Federal Courts Study Committee 
The Federal Courts Study Committee's recommendation to 
Congress concerning supplemental jurisdiction filled less than 
two pages of full text. The Committee recommended that the 
result in Finley be overruled and that Congress provide a stat- 
utory basis for supplemental jurisdi~tion.~~ While the Commit- 
tee did not draft a proposed statute, their recommendation was 
couched in terms similar to the text of subsection (c). Instead of 
allowing discretionary consideration of the instances in subsec- 
tion (c), the recommendation stated that "Congress should 
direct federal courts to dismiss state claims if these claims 
predominate or if they present novel or complex questions of 
state law, or if dismissal is warranted in the particular case by 
considerations of fairness or economy."83 This last element 
incorporates some semblance of the Gibbs factors, but the other 
bases-novel or complex state claims or predominant state 
claims-give the district court no discretion to retain jurisdic- 
tion regardless of the efficiency or fairness that the exercise of 
supplemental jurisdiction may promote. 
The Committee's Working Papers, while not adopted by the 
entire Committee, provide further insight into the reasoning 
which underlies the Committee's recommendation and include 
a recommended supplemental jurisdiction statute.84 The 
80. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 US .  343, 350 (1988). 
81. They are, however, mentioned in the Committee Report. "Congress should 
direct federal courts to dismiss state claims . . . if dismissal is warranted in the 
particular case by considerations of fairness or economy." COMMI'ITEE REPORT, su- 
pra note 38, at 48. 
82. Id. at 47. 
83. Id. at 48 (emphasis added). 
84. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 39, at 567-68. The discretionary portion of 
the recommended statute reads as follows: 
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Working Papers note that under Gibbs, district courts rarely 
exercised their discretion to decline supplemental claims unless 
the federal claim had been dismissed before trial-even when 
state claims predominated or were novel or c~mplex.'~ It is 
probable that this recognized weakness in the district courts7 
application of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction led to novel or 
complex claim or predominant state claim elements being listed 
in the current statute. Their inclusion indicates that one of the 
problems to be corrected by the new statute was federal over- 
reaching into issues more appropriate for state courts. This 
corrective action suggests that there may be no room for weigh- 
ing of economy, efficiency and fairness factors when the deci- 
sion to exercise or decline pendent jurisdiction centers on 
claims that are arguably novel or complex or on a case in which 
state law predominates. To the contrary, if those circumstances 
exist, the judge should not have the discretion to retain juris- 
diction. 
The Working Papers address the Gibbs factors in a foot- 
note, acknowledging that the district court can consider judicial 
economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants and that 
the federal courts have been acting in accordance with Gibbs 
with respect to these factors. The footnote concludes by noting 
that "[nlothing in our proposal is intended to or should affect 
this pra~tice."'~ 
The statute set forth in the Working Papers addresses the 
apparent contradiction between the footnote's statement and 
the stated purpose of curtailing federal overreaching. It begins 
by listing the instances in which the federal courts have been 
derelictcdeciding claims that are more appropriately decided 
in state court. The final catchall category then lists the Gibbs 
factors for consideration.'' Listing the Gibbs discretionary fac- 
tors separate from the novel or complex state claims or predom- 
inant state claims analysis seems to indicate that the Commit- 
tee considered an approach distinct from Gibbs for the first two 
(c) The district court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over a claim 
under subsection (a) if the claim presents a novel or complex issue of 
state law, state law issues predominate, or there are other appropriate 
reasons (including judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants. 
Id. at 568. 
85. Id. at 561-62. 
86. Id. at 562 n.35. 
87. Id. at 568. For the text of the discretionw portion of the statute, see 
supra note 84. 
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factual scenarios. The Working Paper's approach appears to be 
the most rational, and the draft statute is most in line with the 
drafters' goal-to encourage federal courts to refrain from de- 
ciding as many state claims and to leave the Gibbs discretion- 
ary analysis unchanged. 
Two points are worth making here. The language of this 
particular statute cast the consideration of state claim complex- 
ity or predominance as a different consideration than the econ- 
omy, efficiency and fairness analysis. Second, the supplemental 
jurisdiction statute as enacted differs from this draft," and 
the omission of the Gibbs factors in the supplemental jurisdic- 
tion statute severely weakens the argument that the common- 
law analysis remained untouched. 
4. Clarifying subsection (c)(4) 
Subsection (c)(4) incorporates a strict, vague, catchall pro- 
vision. "The district courts may decline to exercise supplemen- 
tal jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . . . in ex- 
ceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for 
declining j~risdiction."~~ A fundamental question is whether 
those exceptional circumstances and other compelling reasons 
incorporate the considerations of "judicial economy, convenience 
and fairness to the  litigant^."^^ Although some argue that the 
Gibbs factors are incorporated in the statuteg1 or even that 
the statute did not change prior practice.92 The fact of the 
matter is that from the Working Papers of the Federal Courts 
Study Committeeg3 to the penultimate draft of the statute be- 
fore ~ongress:~ the Gibbs factors were in the text of the pro- 
posed statute:5 but they were withdrawn at  the last minute 
88. Compare supra note 84 with 28 U.S.C. $ 1367(c). 
89. 28 U.S.C. 8 1367(c)(4). 
90. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 US. 715, 726 (1966); see Carnegie- 
Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 US. 343, 350 (1980). 
91. See inpa  part W.C. 
92. Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 6 F.3d 1176, 1182 (7th Cir. 
1993); Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County, 983 F.2d 1277, 1284 (3d Cir. 
1993); see inpa  part W.B. 
93. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 39. 
94. Wolf, supra note 40, at  58 app. E. 
95. In the statute proposed in the Working Papers, the corresponding section 
of the proposal included the following sentence: "The district court may decline to 
exercise jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . there are other appropriate reasons 
(including judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants) to refuse jurisdic- 
tion." WORKING PAPERS, supra note 39, a t  568. Congress relied heavily on the 
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because some commentators had criticized that language as 
allowing too much discretion to the district courts.96 
This Part will examine the individual subsections of 
5 1367(c) in terms of their common-law origin, legislative histo- 
ry, and particular issues that arise with respect to each. 
A. Subsection 1367(c)(1): Novel or Complex Issues of State 
Lawg7 
Subsection (c)(l) allows the district court to decline to exer- 
cise supplemental jurisdiction if "the claim raises a novel or 
complex issue of state law."98 The novel or complex issue ele- 
ment of subsection (c) may have found its genesis in Gibbs, but 
it was not clearly articulated in the same terms.'' I t  is more 
likely that this particular consideration arose from jurispru- 
dence which permits a district court to decline to exercise juris- 
diction when comity would be best served by allowing states to 
Rowe-Burbank-Mengler proposal. Their proposal also incorporated the Gibbs factors 
and mimicked the language from the statute in the Working Papers. "The districts 
[sic] courts may decline to exercise jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . there are 
other appropriate reasons, such as judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to 
the litigants, for declining jurisdiction." Wolf, supra note 40, a t  58 app. E. 
In fairness, all of the proposed statutes did not contain the Gibbs factors, see 
id. at  53 app. B (the Wolf-Egnal Proposal) and id. 55 app. C (H.R. 5381 8 120 (the 
initial draft before Congress)), and the Working Papers were not adopted by the 
Federal Courts Study Committee as a whole, but are merely the subcommittee 
reports. In their report, the Federal Courts Study Committee did not drafi a stat- 
ute nor did they recommend one. See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 38, a t  47-48. 
96. Wolf, supra note 40, a t  25. In making this assertion, Professor Wolf, who 
was involved in the legislative process, relies upon a conversation with Charles G. 
Geyh, because the reasons for the changes from the Gibbs language to the more 
stringent "exceptional circumstances" and "compelling reasons" language are not 
apparent from the hearings. Id. at  25 & 11.145. Mr. Geyh was counsel to the 
House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Adminis- 
tration of Justice and was assigned to this particular bill. Id. at  17 11.91. 
97. It should be noted that some commentators have traced the lineage of 
subsection (c)(l) to abstention jurisprudence. Granted some of the verbiage of the 
two analyses is similar. However, the contention is flawed. There is a fundamental 
difference between abstention, in which a court considers refraining from hearing 
claims properly within its original jurisdiction, and the supplemental jurisdiction 
analysis in which a court affirmatively decides whether to hear a claim specifically 
outside its original jurisdiction. 
98. 28 U.S.C. $ 1367(c)(l). 
99. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (suggesting that 
a court decline jurisdiction if "state issues substantially predominate . . . in terms 
. . . of the scope of the issues raised"). 
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decide cases of first impression or upon tenuous footing in state 
law.loO The Supreme Court specifically recognized the novel- 
and-complex-state-claim standard in Moor v. County of 
Alamedalol when it declined to exercise jurisdiction over "dif- 
ficult or unsettled issues of state law."lo2 The policy underly- 
ing the encouragement of federal courts to decline to hear nov- 
el, complex, or state issues of first impression is comity; state 
law should be developed by the state courts, not by federal 
courts guessing, no matter how educated the guess, what state 
supreme courts would decide. lo3 
B. Subsection 1367(c)(2): State Law Claim Predominates 
The district court may decline to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction if "the claim substantially predominates over the 
claim or claims over which the district court has original juris- 
diction."lo4 This factor addresses the concern of the inappro- 
priate encroachment of federal courts into cases of state import 
and the unscrupulous use of federal claims and federal courts 
to litigate primarily state issues. 
The Gibbs Court thought that if state claims predominate, 
the considerations of economy, convenience, and fairness would 
weigh in favor of dismissing the state claims.105 In contrast, 
post-codification courts considering whether state claims pre- 
dominate consider primarily the relative weight and number of 
100. See Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 449-50 (9th Cir. 
1994) (refusal to hear state constitutional establishment claims because they creat- 
ed issues of first impression was not an abuse of discretion); Medrano v. City of 
Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 1499, 1506 (9th Cir. 1992); Winn v. North Am. Philips 
Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1424, 1426 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (dismissing under subsection (c)(l) 
a state law claim for tortious sexual harassment as a previously unrecognized 
claim and negligent hiring, negligent supervision, negligent training and their rela- 
tion to workers' compensation as implicating undeveloped state law issues). 
101. 411 US. 693 (1973). 
102. Id. a t  715-16. 
103. "Another factor to be weighed is the clarity of the law that governs a 
pendent claim, for the federal court may be wise to forego the exercise of supple- 
mental jurisdiction when the state law that undergirds the nonfederal claim is of 
dubious scope and application." Rodriguez v. Dora1 Mortg. Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 
1177 (1st Cir. 1995). 
104. 28 U.S.C. 8 1367(c)(2). 
105. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966) ("[Ilf it ap- 
pears that the state issues substantially predominate, whether in terms of proof, of 
the scope of the issues raised, or of the comprehensiveness of the remedy sought, 
the state claims may be dismissed without prejudice and left for resolution to state 
tribunals."). The primary motivation for declining jurisdiction in this instance was 
to provide the litigants a "surer-footed reading" of state law. Id. a t  726. 
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the claims,106 not whether the Gibbs factors weigh in favor of 
exercising jurisdiction once the state claims are determined to 
predominate. 
C. Subsection 1367(c)(3): Dismissal of Jurisdiction Conferring 
Claim 
Of all the circumstances listed in subsection (c), dismissal 
of the jurisdiction-conferring claim is the one that most fre- 
quently confronts district courts. If the "district court has dis- 
missed all of the claims over which it has original jurisdic- 
t i~n"'~'  then the court has discretion not to exercise jurisdic- 
tion over the supplemental claim. 
The doctrinal background of the dismissal factor involves 
the problematic use of the federal courts to litigate state 
claims. This differs from the problem of an insubstantial feder- 
al claim which, once dismissed, destroys the basis for the exer- 
cise of supplemental jurisdi~tion.'~~ Instead, the dismissal 
factor becomes relevant after the federal claim has been dis- 
missed on a nonjurisdictional basis, leaving the state claims 
remaining to be resolved. 
Prior to the supplemental jurisdiction statute, the practice 
was to determine at what point in the proceeding the federal 
claim was dismissed, and make the determination of whether 
or not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction based upon a sim- 
ple efficiency analysis--efficiency in this context usually means 
how much effort has been put into the entire case.log The 
106. See Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 951, 959-60 (E.D. 
Mich. 1992) (declining to exercise jurisdiction over three state law claims because 
they predominated over the single federal claim in number and weight); Council of 
Unit Owners of the Wisp Condominium, Inc. v. Recreational Indus., Inc., 793 F. 
Supp. 120, 123 (D. Md. 1992) (declining to exercise jurisdiction over 12 state 
claims with only one federal antitrust claim when the state claims were all incon- 
sistent with the federal claim); James v. Sun Glass Hut, 799 F. Supp. 1083 (D. 
Colo. 1992) (suggesting that when the only federal claim is an age discrimination 
claim, the balance would favor not exercising jurisdiction over supplemental state 
claims). But see Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 789-90 (3d Cir. 
1995) (dicta) (rejecting the pure numerosity approach and analyzing the claims in 
terms of comprehensiveness of remedy, terms of proof, and scope of issues). 
107. 28 U.S.C. 5 1367(c)(3). 
108. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
109. In Gibbs, dismissal of a federal claim before trial was listed as an in- 
stance in which efficiency, fairness and economy would weigh in favor of dismissal 
of the pendent state claims as well. Gibbs, 383 U.S. a t  726. In Carnegie-Mellon the 
Court noted that the assertion in Gibbs that the pendent claims should be dis- 
missed once the jurisdiction-granting claim was dismissed did "not establish a 
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courts asked whether declining to exercise jurisdiction over the 
pendent and ancillary claims would result in duplicative litiga- 
tion in state court. This standard was mentioned in Gibbs to 
illustrate that the exercise of pendent jurisdiction would not be 
proper when the federal claim was dismissed at  the outset.110 
As mentioned above, although the Gibbs factors are not 
mentioned in the statute or the legislative history, when faced 
with supplemental claims after dismissal of a federal claim, 
most courts have followed the direction of Carnegie-Mellon and 
held that dismissal of the federal claim does not mandate dis- 
missal or remand of the supplemental claims."' Instead, the 
courts consider the goal of efficient adjudication of claims to 
determine whether to dismiss or remand the state claims.lf2 
It is apparent that under subsection (c)(3) the courts are 
not readily willing to interpret the statute as changing prior 
practice. This reaction may be attributable to the fact that the 
majority of the litigation over appropriateness of pendent and 
ancillary jurisdiction, both before and after the supplemental 
jurisdiction statute, has involved dismissal of the jurisdiction- 
granting claim. 
D. Subsection l367(c)(4): Exceptional Circumstances 
Subsection (c)(4) is the most interesting statutory basis 
under which the court may decline to exercise jurisdiction. It 
provides that "the district courts may decline to exercise sup- 
plemental jurisdiction . . . i f .  . . in exceptional circumstances, 
there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdic- 
mandatory rule to be applied inflexibly in all cases." Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. 
Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988). 
110. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726 ("Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed 
before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state 
claims should be dismissed as well."). 
111. Carnegie-Mellon, 484 US. at  350 n.7. 
112. See Timm v. Mead Corp., 32 F.3d 273, 277 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Carne- 
gie-Mellon); Purgess v. Sharrock, 33 F.3d 134, 138 (2d Cir. 1994) (upholding the 
district court's weighing of economy, convenience and fairness with respect to sup- 
plemental claims after dismissal of federal claim); Eubanks v. Gerwen, 40 F.3d 
1157, 1161-62 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Carnegie-Mellon); Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. 
No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 450 (9th Cir. 1994); Taylor v. First of Am. Bank-Wayne, 973 
F.2d 1284, 1287-89 (6th Cir. 1992) (considering judicial economy and fairness); ITT 
Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Unlimited Automotive, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 664, 669 (N.D. 
Ill. 1992) (relying on judicial economy and efficiency). But see Wentzka v. Gellman, 
991 F.2d 423, 425 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that exercise of pendent jurisdiction is 
an abuse of discretion unless there is an alternate basis of jurisdiction for the 
claim or the statute of limitations has run on the claim). 
1286 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995 
tion."l13 Congress has created a catchall section here, ac- 
knowledging that "occasionally there may exist other compel- 
ling reasons for a district court to decline supplemental juris- 
diction, which the subsection does not foreclose a court fiom 
considering in exceptional ~ircurnstances."~~~ There is no 
guidance, however, on what those exceptional circumstances 
are, or on when they are properly deemed to be compelling. 
The courts, for the most part, have interpreted subsection 
(c)(4) in accord with its legislative history, by not reading it as 
incorporating the Gibbs factors or using it to exercise their 
discretion in a manner not contemplated by Congress.l15 The 
effect of the exceptional circumstances language has been to 
cabin the courts discretion as intended. Examples of instances 
in which courts have declined to exercise supplemental juris- 
diction in the face of exceptional circumstances include a man- 
damus claim against a state agency,lI6 a petition to combine 
certifiable federal class-action claims with a noncertifiable state 
claim,117 a federal claim fundamentally inconsistent with 
state claims,118 claims identical to the supplemental claim 
pending in state court,llg and state claims currently being lit- 
igated sought to be removed with a federal third-party officer 
immunity claim. 120 
113. 28 U.S.C. 5 1367(c)(4). 
114. H.R. REP. NO. 734, supra note 43, at  29. 
115. See supra part II.B.4. 
116. Clemes v. Del Norte County Unified Sch. Dist., 843 F. Supp. 583, 596 
(N.D. Cal. 1994). Note, however, that the issue of mandamus against the state 
agency was "uniquely in the interest and domain of the state courts." Id. As such, 
the court could have appropriately resolved the claim under 8 1367(c)(l) without 
resorting to (c)(4) as well. 
117. In Re Synergen, Inc. Sec. Litig., 154 F.R.D. 265, 269 (D. Colo. 1994). 
118. Council of Unit Owners, Inc. v. Recreational Indus., Inc., 793 F. Supp. 
120, 122-23 (D. Md. 1992) (declining to exercise jurisdiction because the federal 
claim, while tenuous, was an antitrust claim alleging that the defendant was en- 
gaging in non-competitive practices while the pendent state law claims were all 
contract claims alleging a violation of a non-competition clause). 
119. Hays County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 125 (5th Cir. 1992) (up- 
holding the district court's decision not to exercise jurisdiction over state law 
claims against officials in their individual capacity after the same claims against 
officials in their official capacity had been found to violate the 11th Amendment 
and had been remanded to state court); Lord Fairchild Corp. v. Matsushita Elect. 
Indus. Co., 840 F. Supp. 211, 216-18 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (declining to allow addition of 
a patent ownership claim to a patent infringement claim when the patent owner- 
ship claim was being litigated in state court). 
120. The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state 
law claims removed with a federal third-party claim under the federal officer re- 
moval statute because a) the state claims were asbestos claims and if brought into 
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Some courts have, however, used subsection (c)(4) to read 
prior practice back into the statute. This is most common when 
the court is asked to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
state claims that if included at  trial would confuse the 
jury.l2l Gibbs specifically suggests jury confusion as an in- 
stance that would make the exercise of pendent claims improp- 
er. 122 
The supplemental jurisdiction statute has codified many of 
the Gibbs suggestions of when jurisdiction would be improper, 
but did not include jury confusion as a circumstance when 
discretion may be exercised. Given the "exceptional circum- 
stance" language of (c)(4), the fact that the legislative history 
suggested that it be used only occasionally,123 and the Su- 
preme Court's recognition of jury confusion as a factor to be 
considered in Moor u. County of Alameda,124 it seems that the 
statute would exclude jury confusion as an "exceptional circum- 
stance" where the court could decline jurisdiction. Indeed, the 
First Circuit, in Vera-Lozano v. International  roadc casting'^^ 
refused to hold that a district court abused its discretion by 
failing to consider the possibility of jury confusion in deciding 
to entertain supplemental claims,126 contending that the only 
relevant factors were the predominance and complexity of the 
state claims.127 
federal court would have to be transferred to another federal court handling the 
pre-trial portion of all related asbestos claims, b) state asbestos claims had been 
pending in state court for three years, and c) the state claims were not directly 
concerned with the issues in the federal third-party claim. Crocker v. Borden, Inc., 
852 F. Supp. 1322, 1329-31 (E.D. La. 1994). 
121. See Padilla v. City of Saginaw, 867 F. Supp. 1309, 1315 (E.D. Mich. 1994) 
(citing jury confusion as a sufficiently compelling reason to decline jurisdiction over 
supplemental claims); Roy v. Russel County Ambulance Serv., 809 F. Supp. 517, 
523 (W.D. Ky. 1992); 13B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 9, 5 3567.1 11.46 (suggest- 
ing jury confusion as a possible exceptional circumstance). 
122. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 343 U.S. 715, 727 (1966). 
123. H.R. REP. NO. 734, supra note 43, a t  29. 
124. 411 U.S. 693, 716 (1973). 
125. 50 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 1995). 
126. Id. at  70. 
127. Id. 
IBC's only argument is that the district court abused its discretion in 
exercising jurisdiction over the state claims because the state statutes 
have different standards of proof and may therefore confuse the jury. . . . 
Here there is clearly no such abuse [of discretion]: the state claims do not 
predominate; Vera points to no novel issue of state law; and joint adjudi- 
cation serves the interest of judicial economy and fairness. 
Id. 
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IV. APPROACHES TAKEN BY THE COURTS 
The distinctions between the Gibbs analysis and the sup- 
plemental jurisdiction statute analysis are apparent, and future 
clarification from either Congress or the Supreme Court is 
uncertain. Faced with these ambiguities, the courts have taken 
four distinct approaches in interpreting what the supplemental 
jurisdiction statute requires: the plain meaning approach, the 
Gibbs approach, the Executive Software approach, and the (c)(4) 
approach. The plain meaning and the Gibbs approach are at  
the poles of discretion, while the Executive Software approach 
occupies the middle ground? 
A. The Plain Meaning Approach 
The plain meaning approach is best articulated in 
LaSorella v. Penrose St. Francis Health Care Sy~tern . '~~  The 
plaintiff was an employee of a company that merged to form 
the defendant company. He was fired from the pre-merger 
company, and when he was not rehired, he brought a federal 
age discrimination claim and state estoppel claims against the 
defendant. In deciding to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over the state law claims, the court recognized that while the 
legislative history of the supplemental jurisdiction statute 
states that it codifies the Gibbs analysis, the statute on its face 
does not.'" The court decided to ignore the legislative history 
and instead applied the plain, unambiguous meaning of the 
statute.13' Under this approach, the question was whether 
the state law claims predominated, not whether considerations 
of fairness, judicial economy, and comity would best be served 
by the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the state law 
~ 1 a i m . l ~ ~  Because the state law claims did not predominate, 
there were no novel or complex issues of state law, the federal 
128. There is some complexity in distinguishing the cases as all the jurisdic- 
tional analysis occurs under 8 1367 rubric. See Thomas Jamison, Note, Pendent 
Party Jurisdiction: Congress Giveth What the Eighth Circuit Taketh Away, 17 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 753, 783 (1991) (noting that because the standard of review is 
abuse of discretion the district court can do what it pleases without real limita- 
tions by merely mentioning the factors listed in 5 1367(c)). 
129. 818 F. Supp. 1413 (D. Colo. 1993); see Grove Holding Corp. v. First Wis. 
Nat'l Bank, 803 F. Supp. 1486 (E.D. Wis. 1992); see also Lyon v. Whisman, 45 
F.3d 758, 760 (3d Cir. 1995). 
130. LaSorella, 818 F. Supp. a t  1415. 
131. Id. at 1416. 
132. Id. at 1415-17. 
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claim was not dismissed, and there were no extraordinary 
circumstances, the court had jurisdiction over the state law 
claim. 
There is support in the legislative history for this approach 
in the House Report, which reads that the legislature is "codify- 
ing the legitimate bases that the Supreme Court has recognized 
upon which a district court can decline j~risdiction."'~~ This 
implies that the intent of Congress was to constrain, if not re- 
move, the discretion of the district court. 
The core of the plain meaning approach is this: once the 
court finds a circumstance listed in 5 1367(c), the inquiry ends 
and the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is improper. This 
plain meaning interpretation of the statute works very well 
when the district court determines that supplemental claims 
raise novel or complex issues of state law or that the state law 
claim predominates. In those cases, a court can unequivocally 
decide not to exercise jurisdiction. The only consideration is 
comity: whether or not the issues before the federal court 
would be more appropriately before a state court. No possible 
considerations of fairness, convenience, or judicial economy can 
overcome the comity consideration. 
When considering the additional circumstances allowing 
judicial discretion, however, this approach breaks down. The 
ability to unequivocally decide whether or not to exercise juris- 
diction is made more difficult considering that the fundamental 
premise of supplemental jurisdiction is to provide for efficient 
resolution of related claims in one forum. If a court tries to 
apply a plain meaning interpretation when a federal claim is 
dismissed, the result forces the litigants to reassert their 
claims in state court regardless of which stage of the proceed- 
ings the claim is dismissed. This result, if taken to its logical 
extreme, could theoretically abrogate the court's ability to rule 
on supplemental claims at the end of a trial if the court's initial 
decision was to dismiss the federal claim. This outcome paral- 
lels the result of the insubstantial federal claim, and a suffi- 
cient number of courts and commentators have distinguished 
133. H.R. REP. NO. 734, supra, note 43, at 29; see also Thomas M. Mengler et 
al., Congress Accepts Supreme Court's Invitation to Codify Supplemental Jurisdic- 
tion, 74 JUDICATURE 213, 216 (1991) ("[Section 13671 codifies those factors that the 
Supreme Court in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs recognized as providing a sound 
basis for a lower court's discretionary decision to decline supplemental jurisdic- 
tion."). The authors of this article, Professors Mengler, Burbank, and Rowe, were 
involved in drafting the supplemental jurisdiction statute. Id. 
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between the dismissal of the federal claim and the 
insubstantiality of the federal claim to conclude that such abro- 
gation cannot have been intended by Congress. 
Under Gibbs, courts were required to weigh economy, fair- 
ness, and convenience to determine whether they could exercise 
jurisdiction over the supplemental claims after the federal 
claim had been dismissed, regardless of how substantial the 
claim might have been. It is difficult to argue that the supple- 
mental jurisdiction statute changes this analysis. The legisla- 
tive history makes the exercise of discretion a "case-specific 
analysis" and there is no federalism consideration outweighing 
the efficiency considerations that support the decision to exer- 
cise supplemental jurisdiction. 
The plain meaning approach suffers a more fundamental 
flaw when applied in the context of the exceptional circurn- 
stances prong. Plain meaning statutory interpretation pre- 
sumes that the statute is clear on its face. Neither exceptional 
circumstances nor compelling reasons are defined in the statute 
or the legislative history. Application of this portion of subsec- 
tion (c) necessarily involves judicial definition beyond the mere 
announcement that the exceptional circumstance exists and 
that the exercise of jurisdiction is thus improper. 
B. The Gibbs Approach 
In Divens v. Amalgamated Transit Union Internation- 
al,lN members of a local union sued the local and interna- 
tional union on the basis that their freedom of speech was 
violated when they were fined under local union bylaws for 
"speaking in a manner deemed 'disruptive"' in union meet- 
i n g ~ . ' ~ ~  The union members' federal claim alleged a violation 
of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. The 
court, after dismissing the federal claim, declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over state law breach of contract 
claims. While acknowledging that the supplemental jurisdiction 
statute speaks in mandatory terms,'36 the court went on to 
characterize the mandatory language as a "threshold" to be 
crossed. "The statute fairly exudes deference to judicial discre- 
134. 38 F.3d 598 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
135. Id. at 599. 
136. Id. at 600 (The statute seemingly speaks in directory language: jurisdic- 
tion 'shall' be extended to the state claim . . . ."); see Roy v. Russel County Ambu- 
lance Serv., 809 F. Supp. 517, 523 (W.D. Ky. 1992). 
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tion-at least once the threshold determinations have been met 
and the court moves on to consider the ex~eptions."'~~ Under 
Gibbs, the determination that a court has the power to assert 
supplemental jurisdiction is also a threshold to be crossed be- 
fore considering whether or not comity, justice, and fairness 
would support its exercise.'38 Thus the approach adopted by 
the Divens court was essentially the pre-codification Gibbs ap- 
proach. 
The basis most frequently cited for the proposition that the 
statute did not change the common-law analysis comes from 
the legislative history. "This section [I3671 would . . . essential- 
ly restore the pre-Finley understandings of the authorization 
for and limits on . . . supplemental jurisdi~tion."'~~ This inter- 
pretation allows a court to rely upon the pre-codification Gibbs 
analysis and thus incorporate without alteration the Gibbs 
discretionary prong. A second technique used to pull the Gibbs 
factors back into the analysis involves the broad interpretation 
of the word "may" in subsection (c). "The court may decline to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction . . . ."I4' The courts inter- 
pret "may" as implying discretion, and discretion prior to the 
supplemental jurisdiction statute meant considering the Gibbs 
factors. 14' 
One possible weakness in the above technique arises from 
the Working Papers. The Working Papers draft statute, like 
137. Diven, 38 F.3d at  601. 
138. See supra part 1I.A; Rodriguez v. Dora1 Mortg. Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 1177 
(1st Cir. 1995) ("To be sure, the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in such cir- 
cumstances is wholly discretionary. And moreover, the district court, in reaching its 
discretionary determination on the jurisdictional question, will have to assess the 
totality of the attendant circumstances."); Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 
F.3d 780, 787-88 (3d Cir 1995). 
139. H.R. REP. NO. 734, a t  28; see Borough of West Mipin, 45 F.3d a t  787-88; 
Purgess v. Sharrock, 33 F.3d 134, 138 (2d Cir. 1994) ("The statutory concept of 
supplemental jurisdiction codified and expanded somewhat the earlier judge-made 
doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction."); Timm v. Mead Corp., 32 F.3d 
273, 276-77 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Brazinski and specifically calling for a "discre- 
tionary approach in which considerations of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, 
and comity are weighed"); Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 6 F.3d 
1176, 1182 (7th Cir. 1993) ("The legislative history indicates that the new statute 
is intended to codify rather than to alter the judge-made principles of pendent and 
pendent party jurisdiction . . . ."I. 
140. 28 U.S.C. 8 1367(c) (emphasis added). 
141. The primary source for this interpretation comes from Professor Siegel in 
his comments in the U.S.C.A concerning 5 1367 practice. David D. Siegel, Practice 
Commentary, 28 U.S.C.A. 5 1367 (1995); see Purgess, 33 F.3d a t  138; McCullough 
v. Branch Banking & Trust Co. 844 F. Supp. 258, 260 (E.D.N.C. 1993). 
1292 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995 
the current subsection (c) included the "may decline" language. 
However, unlike the enacted statute's subsection (c), the draft 
statute specifically included the Gibbs f a ~ t 0 r s . l ~ ~  If the draft- 
ers had considered the "may" language to include the Gibbs 
considerations, their subsequent inclusion creates a statutory 
redundancy. 
The practical effect of the Gibbs approach is that the dis- 
cretion of the court is not narrowed as was intended by the 
C~mrnittee, '~~ or by those reviewing and drafting the stat- 
ute? The only real change is that Finley was overruled. 
C. The Executive Software Approach 
In Executive Software North America, Inc. v. United States 
District Court,'" the Ninth Circuit sought to establish the 
middle ground. Donna Page, a former employee of Executive 
Software brought state and federal claims against Executive 
Software for alleged racial and religious discrimination. Judge 
Nelson interpreted the discretionary portion of 8 1367 to re- 
quire a two-step analysis. She stated that by listing the four 
circumstances in subsection (c), Congress had intended to cabin 
the previous common-law analysis.'" Due to that limitation, 
a court no longer had discretion to decline the exercise of sup- 
plemental jurisdiction unless one of the specific "factual predi- 
cates" of subsection (c) was apparent;'47 otherwise a court 
must exercise jurisdiction over the supplemental claims. Once a 
court finds a "factual predicate," however, "the exercise of dis- 
142. See supra part III.B.2. 
143. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 39, a t  561-62. 
Except when the federal claim is dismissed before trial, this advice [that 
courts not exercise jurisdiction over pendent claims] has basically been ig- 
nored. If that [pendent] claim withstands pretrial challenge, most courts 
retain jurisdiction over state claims regardless of their complexity, novel- 
ty, or predominance in the litigation. 
The danger that supplemental jurisdiction will strain state-federal rela- 
tions [due to federal courts' commandeering of claims more appropriately 
in state court] can be minimized by directing federal courts to relinquish 
pendent state claims when these claims predominate or when they pres- 
ent novel, complex questions of state law. 
Id. 
144. See supra note 133. 
145. 24 F.3d 1545 (9th Cir. 1994). 
146. Id. at  1556-57; see Palmer v. 
(11th Cir. 1994). 
147. Executive Software, 24 F.3d at  
Pac. Co., 976 F.2d 1303, 1309 (9th Cir. 
Hospital Auth., 22 F.3d 1559, 1569 n.11 
1556 (quoting Imagineering, Inc., v. Kiewit 
1992). 
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cretion . . . is informed by whether remanding pendent state 
claims comports with the underlying objective of 'most sensibly 
accomodat[ing] the values of economy, convenience, fairness, 
and comity."'148 The court supports its use of the discretion- 
ary prong of the Gibbs analysis as the "case-specific analy- 
~ i s " ' ~ ~  required by the legislative history.'" A number of 
courts have used a similar analysis under 5 1367, noting that 
the Gibbs factors are part of the analysis, but only in the con- 
text of the specific circumstances listed in subsection (c).15' 
The exceptional circumstances and compelling reasons 
portion of subsection (c) presents a problem under the Execu- 
tive Software approach. After Executive Software, a district 
court must identi@ the factual predicate before proceeding to 
weigh the Gibbs factors. The challenge lies in identifying excep- 
tional circumstances that would require moving on to the next 
step. Judge Nelson's guidance is minimal. 'Without any indica- 
tion from Congress . . . we think that [Congress] meant to con- 
note that § 1367(c)(4) should apply only in factual circumstanc- 
es that are truly unusual."'52 
148. Id. at  1557; see Palmer, 22 F.3d a t  1569 (citations and footnotes omitted): 
The breadth of discretion afforded federal courts in these cases has been 
codified by section 1367(c). Specifically, it provides for four occasions when 
a federal court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction otherwise 
within its power. The remaining considerations articulated in Gibbs, how- 
ever, have not become useless to federal courts in exercising this discre- 
tion. Rather, while supplemental jurisdiction must be exercised in the 
absence of any of the four factors of section 1367(c), when one or more of 
these factors is present, the additional Gibbs considerations may, by their 
presence or absence, influence the court in its decision concerning the 
exercise of such discretion. Such factors include judicial economy, conve- 
nience, fairness to the parties, and whether all the claims would be ex- 
pected to be tried together. 
149. Executive Software, 24 F.3d a t  1558. 
150. H.R. REP. NO. 734, supra note 43, at  29 ("[Slubsection (c) requires the 
district court, in exercising its discretion, to undertake a case-specific analysis."). 
151. See McLaurin v. Prater, 30 F.3d 982, 985 (8th Cir. 1994); O'Connor v. 
State of Nevada, 27 F.3d 357, 362-63 (9th Cir. 1994); Palmer, 22 F.3d a t  1569; 
Streck v. Peters, 855 F. Supp. 1156, 1166 (D. Haw. 1994) (dicta); see also 
McLaughlin, supra note 46, a t  976 (The Gibbs factors are relevant "only in the 
more limited sense of how they affect the three enumerated factors and one catch- 
all factor of 1367(c)."). 
152. Executive Software, 24 F.3d a t  1558 (reviewing other circuits' treatment of 
"exceptional circumstances" language in other contexts). One commentator inter- 
preted the Executive Software test in a (c)(4) context as follows: "[Tlhe burden is 
on the court choosing not to exercise pendent party jurisdiction to explain its deci- 
sion and to identify the complex or novel state issues which it seeks to avoid." 
Jamison, supra note 128, at  782. 
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The Executive Software approach is particularly suited for 
cases in which the federal claim has been dismissed. Once the 
claim is dismissed, the court must necessarily weigh conve- 
nience and economy to decide if the supplemental claims 
should be retained and decided, or dismissed or remanded. As 
mentioned above, the courts have not been willing to change 
the prior practice of considering efficient resolution of all claims 
in light of the supplementary jurisdiction statute.'53 
D. The (c)(4) Approach 
There is a fourth approach suggested by some commenta- 
t o r ~ ' ~  and in at  least one case,ls5 but to date the approach 
has not been adopted by any court. This Comment will refer to 
it as the (c)(4) approach. Under this approach, the court would 
apply the provisions of (c)(l) through (c)(3) under a plain mean- 
ing approach-a strictly textualist approach with no discretion 
to retain jurisdiction over supplemental claims if one of the in- 
stances in subsections (c)(l) through (c)(3) is present. However, 
situations outside the scope of (c)(l) through (c)(3) would be 
handled under (c)(4), which this approach's proponents believe 
has subsumed the discretionary portion of the Gibbs analysis 
as stated in Carnegie-Mellon. However, the legislative history 
of the section effectively refutes this interpretation. In two 
drafts of the statute circulating through Congress prior to its 
passage the subsection that eventually became (c)(4) specifical- 
ly contained the Gibbs factors,156 but in the final version the 
Gibbs language was taken out for arguably stronger lan- 
g ~ a g e . ' ~ ~  The fact that the specific Gibbs factors were includ- 
153. See supra part 1II.C. 
154. See, e.g., Timothy E. Congrove, Comment, A Look a t  Supplemental Juris- 
diction Following Its Codification, 40 KAN. L. REV. 499, 520 (1992) (questioning the 
parallel between the Gibbs discretionary analysis and the 8 1367(c) approach and 
resolving the issue providing that 8 1367(c)(4) "compelling reasons" subsume the 
remainder of the Gibbs considerations; relying on the statement from the legisla- 
tive history that the statute was meant to .codify pre-existing case law); see also 
McLaughlin, supra note 46, at  977 11.618 ("The courts could interpret 5 1367(c)(4)'s 
undefined catchall of 'other compelling reasons' as embodying these [Gibbs] fac- 
tors."). 
155. First Interregional Equity Corp. v. Haughton, 805 F. Supp. 196, 200 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
156. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text. 
157. One can. see the difference between language that reads, "The districts 
[sic] courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction . . . if . . . there are 
other appropriate reasons, such as judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to 
the litigants," Wolf, supra note 40, a t  57 app. D (the Weis Proposal), and "The 
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ed in initia 
mines the 
acceptance 
1 drafts, then subsequently rejected, seriously under- 
veracity of this approach and it has received little 
by the district or appellate courts. 
Congress has attempted to reestablish supplemental juris- 
diction as it existed prior to the Supreme Court's decision in 
Finley. However, in the legislative process the focus of the text 
of the statute shifted from providing a statutory basis for pen- 
dent and ancillary jurisdiction, as established by Gibbs, to 
providing a broader grant of power to the federal judiciary by 
mandating that district courts accept supplemental claims with 
limited exceptions. The clear departure of the statute from the 
well-established verbiage of the common-law pendent jurisdic- 
tion analysis and the ambiguity and seeming contradictions in 
the legislative history left the discretionary portion of the sup- 
plemental jurisdiction statute open to varying interpretations. 
Courts have adopted four distinct approaches to the discretion- 
ary analysis under the supplemental jurisdiction statute. Of 
these, the approach adopted by the greatest number of the 
federal appellate courts is the Executive Software approach. 
Only in the limited circumstances listed in the subsection (c) of 
the supplemental jurisdiction statute do the trial courts have 
any discretion to decline to entertain the supplemental claims. 
Of all the approaches, the Executive Software approach is 
the most consistent with the purposes of the Federal Courts 
Study Committee-to discourage federal overreaching into 
areas of law more appropriately reserved for state courts, the 
legislative history, and the plain meaning of the stat- 
ute-providing discretion to decline jurisdiction only in specific 
circumstances. 
The Executive Software approach will become the prevalent 
approach in the majority of circuits within the years to come. 
The practical effect of the pervasive adoption of Executive Soft- 
ware will result in increased scope of federal jurisdiction and a 
district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction . . . if . . . in ex- 
ceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdic- 
tion." 28 U.S.C. 5 1367(c)(4). Incidentally, the language in the Weis Proposal was 
identical to the language in the Rowe-Burbank-Mengler proposal. See Wolf, supra 
note 40, at 58 app. E. 
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corresponding decrease in the discretion of federal courts to 
determine which supplemental claims it will hear. 
Jon D. Corey 
